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State v. Chauvin: Determining the Admissibility of a Post­
Traumatic Stress Syndrome Diagnosis as Substantive 
Evidence of Sexual Abuse 
Thirty-four-year-old John Amos Chauvin (Chauvin) was 
accused of sexually molesting his fiancee's niece and her niece's 
friend in June of 1999.1 Fifteen year-old A.C.2 testified that she was 
visiting her friend A.L.'s home on Father's Day when Chauvin 
sexually molested her.3 Fourteen-year-old A.L. claimed that later that 
same day Chauvin put his tongue in her mouth when kissing her 
goodbye.4 The alleged incidents were reported four days later to the 
Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Department by A.C. 's older sister, in 
whom the two girls confided.5 Chauvin was later convicted in 
Louisiana District Court for the Parish of Terrebonne on two counts of 
indecent behavior withjuveniles.6 
At the trial, the State sought to introduce the testimony of a 
clinical social worker who had treated one of the girls for Post­
Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD).1 Because the social worker's 
expert opinion indicated that A.C. 's PTSD symptoms were consistent 
with those of a sexual abuse victim, the State introduced the 
testimony as substantive evidence that A.C. had in fact been sexually 
abused.8 Despite the defendant's objection, the trial court allowed the 
State to introduce the social worker's testimony without holding a 
hearing to determine whether the expert's testimony was scientifically 
reliable, and thus admissible, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 9 Finding that the trial court had erroneously 
failed to hold a Daubert hearing, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of 
Appeal reversed the convictions and remanded the matter for a new 
trial.10 The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that an e xpert's 
l. State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 698-99 (La. 2003). 
2. The Louisiana Supreme Court Rules require the identification of the victims by 
their initials for the protection of their anonymity. Id at 698 n.3 (citing La. Sup. Ct. Rule 
XXXII § 3). 
3. Id. at 699. 
4. Id 
5. Id 
6. Id at 700. 
7. Id at 699. 
8. Id 
9. Id 
10. Id at 700. 
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diagnosis of PTSD, when used to prove that sexual ab use has 
occurred, is not scientifically reliable under Daubert, and therefore is 
inadmissible. State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 709 (La. 2003). 
The admissibility of expert testimony in Louisiana courts is 
governed by article 702 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, which is 
substantially similar to its federal correlate, Federal Rule of Evidence 
702.11 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court held that Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 requires the trial court to "ensure that any and 
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but 
reliable."12 The Daubert Court set forth four "general observations" 
that the trial court should make when determining whether scientific 
testimony is sufficiently reliable, including: ( 1) whether the theory 
has been published or subjected to peer review, (2) the theory's error 
rate, (3) the testability of the theory, and ( 4) whether the theory is 
generally accepted in the scientific community.1.i Daubert also 
counsels trial judges to attend to other evidentiary rules when 
deciding the admissibility of expert testimony.14 Specifically, Daubert 
requires that the trial judge apply Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to 
determine whether the probative value of expert testimony is 
outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury."15 
11. State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (La. 1993). Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the fonn of an opinion or othetwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of 
the case. 
FED. R. Evm. 702. Louisiana's corresponding rule reads: "If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to detennine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or othetwise." LA. CODE Evm. ANN. 
art. 702 (West 2004). 
12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S . 579, 589 (1993). Prior to the 
Court's ruling in Daubert, the test for the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702 required "general acceptance" among the scientific community of the 
scientific technique at issue. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1122-23. 
13. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1122 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94). 
14. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59 5. 
" 
15. Id (quoting �ED. R. Evm. 403). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides in full, 
Alth�ugh relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outwe1ghe� by �e danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or . by cons1derat10ns of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403. 
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In State v. Foret, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the 
Daubert ruling, holding that scientific evidence must "rise to a 
threshold level of reliability" to be admissible under article 702 of the 
Louisiana Code of Evidence.16 In addition, the Foret court embraced 
the "observations" that Daubert provided.11 The Foret court also 
noted that State v. Catanese, a prior Louisiana decision, requires the 
use of a balancing test that weighs the probative value of scientific 
evidence against its potential for prejudice and confusion of the 
• 18 issues. 
PTSD generally satisfies the Daubert admissibility standard 
because it is testable, published, and recognized within the scientific 
community.19 PTSD has been recognized by the American Psychiatric 
Association as a diagnosable anxiety disorder since its introduction 
into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV) in 1983.20 
At least one scholar maintains that because PTSD generally 
satisfies the Daubert standard, it should be admissible "whenever 
mental state or injury is at issue."21 Other commentators have found 
that PTSD, though generally reliable to diagnose trauma, is unreliable 
when used to diagnose sexual abuse.22 These authors cite research 
indicating that PTSD is too narrow a diagnosis for sexual abuse 
victims, who often suffer from a greater range of symptoms than other 
PTSD patients. 23 Other critics purport that PTSD symptoms are often 
seen in otherwise psychologically healthy individuals, and thus are 
not a reliable indicator of abnormality.24 Still another concern is that 
PTSD is known to result from a variety of stressors, including, but not 
limited to, sexual assault.25 
16. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1123. 
17. Id 
18. Id at 1123 n.6; see also State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 979-81 (La. 1979) 
(holding that the probative value of polygraph evidence is outweighed by the potential for 
prejudice, waste of time, and misleading the jury ). 
19. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and 
Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 9, 29-30 
(2001). 
20. State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 704 (La. 2003) (citing I E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE 
IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 5.3, 423 n. 75 (3d ed. 1997) (citation omitted)). 
21. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 19, at I 0. 
22. Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological 
Testimony in Cluld Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2027, 204 7 ( 1994 ). 
23. Id 
24. Id at 2048. 
25. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wondeis of the Invisible World· Prosecutoda/ 
Syndrome and Profile Evidence in the: Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REv. 43, 96 (200 I). 
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One particularly complicating factor is the unclear distinction 
between PTSD, Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS), and Child Sexual 
Abuse Acconnnodation Syndrome (CSAAS).2" Many com mentators 
and courts discuss the syndromes interchangeably.21 Such overlap 
may be improper, as PTSD is a diagnosable anxiety disorder resulting 
from an array of traumatic stressors, while RTS and CSAAS are 
merely "descriptions of behavior" that follow spec(/ic traumatic 
events.28 Whereas PTSD has been included in the DSM-lV since 
1980, the other two syndromes are not included in this reference.2'/ 
Also unlike PTSD, the other syndromes are insufficiently tested and 
have high error rates.Jo Some connnentators arg ue that because the 
syndromes are confused, PTSD testimony is often inappropriately 
excluded in the courtroom.J' 
The federal courts have not settled on a uniform approach to the 
admissibility of a PTSD diagnosis as substantive evidence of sexual 
abuse.J2 Although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on 
the admissibility of PTSD testimony in sexual abuse cases, one 
federal circuit court has held that PTSD testimony is admissible as 
substantive evidence of sexual assault.33 In S.M. v. J.K., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the plaintiff's use 
26. Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a Behavioral Science 
Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Tna!s, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 591, 6 40 (2000). 
Rape Trauma Syndrome describes the specific traumatic reactions suffered by rape victims. 
Id at 601. Similarly, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome seeks to "provide a 
'common language"' to describe the specific reactions that a child has to sexual abuse. 
Askowitz, supra note 22, at 2038 (citing Ronald C. Sununit, The Child Sexual Abuse 
Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177' 186-87 ( 1983 )). 
27. Garrison, supra note 26, at 640; see, e.g., Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1294 
(Md. l 995) ("PTSD is sometimes defined in terms of the stressor which caused it. 
Accordingly, when the stressor is rape, the term "rape trauma syndrome . . . is sometimes 
used.") 
28. Garrison, supra note 26, at 640. 
29. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 19, at 30. 
30. Id 
. 
31. Id at 31 �citing Sue Osthoff, Preface to Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert 
Testimony on Battenng and Its Effects in Criminal Cases 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 75 84 
(1996)). 
' ' 
32. Because the Louisiana evidentiary rule at issue is substantially similar to its 
federal correlate, both federal and other states' case law is applicable to its interpretation. 
State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1121(La.1993). An examination of federal and other states' 
�se law is also relevant, as the question of admissibility raised in Chauvin is one of first 
impression in Louisiana. 
_
33. S.M. v. J.K., 262 F.3d 914, 920-22 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Isely v. Capuchin 
Pr:ovrnce, 877 F. �upp. I 055, l 067 (E.D. Mich. l 995) (holding in a civil matter that an expert 
witness may testify that plaintiff suffers from PTSD though she may not testify that she 
believes plaintiff was sexually abused). 
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of a PTSD diagnosis as proof that she had been sexually assaulted.34 
The defendant objected to the testimony, claiming that the expert's 
opinion was scientifically unreliable and that it improperly 
substantiated the plaintiff's credibility.35 The trial judge overruled the 
defendant's objections to the testimony, finding that the objections 
related to the weight of the testimony rather than to its admissibility.36 
The Ninth Circuit affmned, noting that Daubert suggests that "shaky 
but admissible evidence" can be appropriately attacked through cross­
examination, thoughtful jury instruction, and contradictory evidence.37 
Conversely, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia held in Spencer v. General Electric Co. that a 
PTSD diagnosis cannot be introduced to prove damages resulting 
from an alleged rape in a civil suit.38 The Spencer court held that the 
expert's testimony usurped the jury's function of assessing the 
credibility of the plaintiff.39 The court also held that the probative 
value of PTSD evidence offered as proof of rape was outweighed by 
its potentially prejudicial effect, finding that the expert's testimony 
"constitutes an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant.'"'0 
State jurisprudence is also shar ply divided on this issue. 
Although many state courts allow expert PTSD testimony as 
substantive proof of sexual abuse, the majority of state supreme 
courts have refused to allow such testimony.41 In Alberico v. State, a 
leading case supporting the substantive use of PTSD testimony, the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico unequivocally held PTSD testimony 
admissible to show that an alleged victim's behavior is consistent with 
sexual abuse.42 As a threshold question, the Alberico court analyzed 
whether PTSD is a scientifically valid theory.43 Noting PTSD's 
34. 
3 5. 
36. 
37. 
(1993)). 
S.M, 2 62 F.3d at 920-22. 
Id at 920. 
Id 
Id at 921-22 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 
38. Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-78 (E.D. Va. 1988) (applying 
the pre-Daubenadmissibility test). 
39. Id a t 1076-77. 
40. Id at 1077. 
41. Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1 2 95 (Md. 1995). For cases holding that PTSD 
evidence is admissible as substantiv e e v idence of sexual abuse, see State v. Albenco, 861 P.2d 
192 (N.M. 1993), and State v. Florczak, 882 P.2d 199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). To compare 
cases refusing to allow evidence of a PTSD diagnosis as proof that sexual abuse occurred, see 
Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 631 N.E.2d 50 
(Mass. 1994); State v. Cressy, 628 A.2d 696 (N.H. 1993); and State v. Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883 
(N.C. 1992). 
42. 861 P.2d at 213-14. 
43. Id at 206. 
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placement in the DSM-IV and finding that PTSD is "grounded in 
basic behavioral psychology," the court determined that PTSD is, in 
fact, scientifically reliable.44 Next, the court discussed whether PTSD 
evidence is probative, that is, it "reliably and accurately proves what it 
purports to prove" and will "assist the trier of fact.'..i1 The court found 
that because a person diagnosed with PTSD might have suffered 
sexual abuse, PTSD "has a tendency to prove" sexual abuse.4'' 
Finally, the court ultimately determined that the potential prejudice 
associated with the PTSD diagnosis does not outweigh its probative 
value, despite the fact that the diagnosis is often based on the victim's 
own reports of abuse; the court held that effective cross-examination 
eliminates any prejudice caused by the clinician's reliance on the 
victim.47 
Conversely, in Hutton v. State, Maryland's highest court held that 
PTSD testimony is inadmissible when introduced to show that an 
alleged victim's behavior is consistent with sexual abuse.4·' After 
reviewing the jurisprudence of several states, the Hutton court found 
that PTSD was inadmissible as substantive proof of sexual abuse 
because it is scientifically unreliable and misleading to the jury.49 The 
court observed that the first criterion of a PTSD diagnosis is the actual 
occurrence of a traumatic stressor.50 In determining whether a 
traumatic stressor has occurred, the diagnosing clinician often relies 
on the victim's own report.51 Thus, when the existence of a stressor 
has not yet been definitively established, the existence of the stressor, 
and thus the veracity of the victim, must be assumed by the clinician.52 
As a result, the court found that PTSD is not a scientifically reliable 
means of proving that sexual abuse is the cause of an alleged victim's 
symptoms.53 The court held that expert testimony that necessarily 
relies on the credibility of the victim usurps the jury's function to 
. 44. Id at 208-09. The court's finding of reliability was also bolstered by the experts' testimony that they could detennine the specific cause o f  the disorder by a patient's specific 
PTSD symptoms. Id at 209. 
45 . Id at 206. 
4?. Id at 20�. The court also took into consideration the experts' claim that they 
could, m fact, detenmne the specific cause of the victim's PTSD. Jd 
47. Idat 210. 
48. Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1301 (Md. 1995). 
49. Id at 1295, 1300. 
50 . Id at 1299. Criteria� A of the diagnostic criteria begins by stating, "The person 
has been exposed to a traumatic event. . .. " AM. PSYCHIATRJC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 427 (4th ed. 1994). 
51. Hutton, 663 A.2d at 1300. 
52. Id at 1295. 
53. Id 
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independently determine the victim's credibility.54 Thus, the court 
held that expert testimony that a victim's PTSD diagnosis is 
consistent with sexual abuse is inadmissible.55 The court also held, 
however, that a diagnosis of PTSD is admissible when introduced to 
explain why an alleged victim's behavior is apparently inconsistent 
with the claim of sexual abuse. 56 
In the noted case, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed both 
scholarly opinion and case law before embracing the Maryland 
court's reasoning in Hutton and holding that PTSD evidence is 
inadmissible when introduced as substantive proof of sexual abuse.57 
Also relying on Hutton, the Chauvin court opined that PTSD 
evidence should be admissible only when offered for the purpose of 
explaining the behavior of a sexual abuse victim.58 
The court looked first to academic literature discussing the use 
of PTSD evidence in sexual abuse cases.59 The court began its 
discussion by noting the competing policy concerns at stake in child 
sexual abuse cases: the concern that child sexual abuse cases are 
difficult by n ature to try must be balanced against the fact that expert 
testimony may be unduly prejudicial to the accused.60 The court then 
discussed the manner in which the academic community views the 
scientific reliability and consequent admissibility of PTSD evidence.61 
The court concluded that PTSD is sufficiently well established in the 
scientific community to generally be an acceptable topic of expert 
testimony,62 but further determined that because PTSD may be caused 
by psychological stressors other than sexual abuse, it is merely a 
54. Id at 1300. 
55. Id at 1301. 
56. Id Children who are sexually abused often hesitate to report their experience to 
adults. John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. 
L. REv. 1, 86-87 (1989). Once a child does report abuse, the account may be inaccurate as a 
result of the child's insecurity and embarrassment. Id at 87. Expert testimony has often been 
allowed to explain that such behavior is not necessarily inconsistent with sexual abuse. See 
People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 137 (1990) (collecting case law allowing expert testimony 
to explain victim behavior). 
57. State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 709 (La. 2003). 
58. Id 
59. Id at 702-04. 
60. Id at 702-03 (citing Dara Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testimony- Seeking an 
Appropdate Admissibility Standard for Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse 
Prosecutions, 48 DUKEL.J. 933, 938 (1999)). 
61. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 703-04. 
62. Id at 704. T he court did not provide any reasoning for this conclusion other than 
a recitation of the diagnostic criteria of the disorder provided in the fourth edition of the 
American P s ychiatric Associat ion's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 
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"therapeutic tool," not intended to specifically identify instances of 
sexual abuse.63 
Turning to an overview of relevant case law, the court noted 
cursorily that Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly held PTSD 
evidence to be admissible in various capacities other than substantive 
proof of sexual abuse.64 Reviewing other states' law, the court found 
that although most states allow PTSD testimony to be introduced to 
explain the unusual behavior of a sexual abuse victim, many do not 
allow PTSD evidence to be introduced as substantive proof of sexual 
abuse.65 Finally, the court quoted extensively from the Maryland 
Supreme Court's decision in Hutton, discussed above.'''' 
After a review of relevant authority, the co urt provided two 
concerns underlying its holding.67 First, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
reasoned that because psychological stressors besides sexual abuse 
may cause PTSD, expert testimony regarding PTSD does not reliably 
prove the fact of abuse.68 The court noted that the DSM-IV itself 
cautions "[n]onclincial decision makers" that a diagnosis of PTSD 
does not necessarily identify the cause of the diagnosis.1'9 Secondly, 
the court expressed concern that such scientifically unreliable 
testimony would unduly prejudice the jury, who would consider this 
testimony from an expert to be a "medical conclusion. "10 
Finally, the court referred to its decision in State v. Foret, in 
which it held that CSAAS testimony was not scientifically valid 
under Daubert when used as substantive evidence of sexual abuse.11 
The court reasoned that because the diagnosis of PTSD is a broader, 
more universal diagnosis than CSAAS, it can be no more reliable for 
evidentiary purposes than a CS AAS diagnosis. 72 The court thus 
placed the same evidentiary constraints on PTSD in Chauvin as it 
63. Id (citingAskowitz&Graham, supra note 22, at 2046). 
64. Id at 704-05 (citing G.N.S. v. S.B.S., 796 So. 2d 739 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2001); 
State ex rel B.J., 767 So. 2d 869 (La. Ct. App. 1 st Cir. 2000); State v. Adkins, 721 So. 2d 
1090 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998); State v. Bosley, 691 So. 2d 347 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); 
Held v. State
_
Fann Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1017 (La. Ct. App. !st Cir. 1992)). The admissibility 
of PTSD testunony as substantiv e proof of sexual abuse is a novel issue in Louisiana. 
65. Id at 705. 
66. Id at 706-07 (citing Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1294-95 (Md. 1995)). 
67. Id at 707. 
68. Id 
69. 
%.
 (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRICASS'N, supra note 50). 70. 
71. 
72. 
Id at 707-08 (citing State v. Foret 628 So. 2d 1116 1127 (La 1993)) 
Id at 708. 
' ' · · 
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placed on CSAAS in Foret, limiting its admissibility to explain the 
unusual behavior of a sexual abuse victim.73 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Weimer opined that the trial 
court did not err in admitting the social worker's testimony that the 
victim's PTSD symptoms were consistent with sexual abuse.74 Justice 
Weimer n oted that the expert at all times observed the DSM-IV's 
warning that a diagnosis of PTSD does not necessarily implicate any 
specific stressor as the cause. 75 He reiterated that the expert's 
testimony was limited to the observation that the victim suffered from 
PTSD and that her symptoms were consistent with having been 
sexually abused. 76 At no time did the expert state that the alleged 
sexual abuse was the cause of the PTSD symptoms the victim 
exhibited.77 Thus, the dissent argued that because the expert did not 
specifically testify as to the credibility of the victim, the testimony 
should have been admissible. 78 
Although the majority correctly determined that PTSD evidence 
offered as substantive evidence of sexual abuse is inadmissible, its 
analysis merely contributes to the confusion of divided opinion 
surrounding this issue. The crux of the majority's holding is its 
finding that because PTSD was designed to be a "therapeutic tool," 
PTSD diagnoses are unreliable to determine whether a given patient 
has suffered from sexual abuse. 79 The notion that PTSD is a mere 
"therapeutic tool" derives from the diagnostic criteria of PTSD listed 
in the DSM-IV.80 According to the DSM-IV, the PTSD diagnosis 
requires, before all else, exposure to a traumatic event.81 W hen the 
traumatic event itself is in question, as is often the case in a sexual 
abuse trial, any PTSD diagnosis must necessarily be based either on 
an assumption that a traumatic event has occurred or on the clinician's 
reliance on the victim's word.82 Because the diagnosis, based on an 
assumed stressor, purports to verify the occurrence of the stressor, the 
73. Id at 709. 
74. Id (Weimer, J., dissenting). 
75. Id (Weimer, J., dissenting). 
76. Id (Weimer, J., dissenting). 
77. Id (Weimer, J., dissenting). 
78. Id (Weimer, J., dissenting). 
79. Id at 707. The court also based its holding in its comparison of PTSD to 
CSAAS. Id at 708. However, such comparison was inappropriate in light of findings that 
PTSD evidence is scientifically reliable, while other "syndrome evidence" is not. Garcia-Rill 
& Beecher-Monas, supmnote 19, at 30. 
80. See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 22, at 2046 & n.91. 
81. AM. PSYCHIATRJCASS'N, supra note 50. 
82. See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 22, at 2046 (explaining that "PTSD assumes 
the presence of a stressor and then attaches a diagnosis to the c hild's reactions to it"). 
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argument that the diagnosis of PTSD implies the occurrence of sexual 
abuse is somewhat circular. 
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court incorrectly held that this 
circular reasoning prevented the PTSD diagnosis from satisfying 
Daubert's requirement of reliability. Daubert requires that a scientific 
methodology, to be reliable, must be tested, published, generally 
accepted, and low in error.83 It is virtually undisputed that the 
diagnosis of PTSD satisfies all of these criteria.K4 The PTSD 
diagnosis is inadmissible, not because it is unreliable, but rather 
because when introduced as substantive evidence of sexual abuse, it 
fails the balancing test required in federal courts by Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 and in Louisiana by State v. Catanese.Ks 
The balancing test requires that the trial judge ascertain whether 
the testimony's probative value is outweighed by its potential for 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unnecessary delay or waste of 
time.86 When used as substantive evidence that sexual abuse has 
occurred, PTSD has very low probative value. As discussed above, a 
PTSD diagnosis often either assumes the occurrence of a traumatic 
event or relies upon the credibility of the victim. In either case the 
diagnosis of PTSD does little to help the jury conclude whether 
sexual abuse actually occurred; in the first instance the jury must 
assume the commission of a crime, and, in the second, the jury is 
merely asked to believe the testimony of the victim. Some probative 
value arises from the presence of the symptoms associated with the 
diagnosis, such as nightmares, irritability, and difficulty concentrating. 
These symptoms may increase the probability that some traumatic 
event, possibly sexual abuse, has occurred. However, as noted above, 
some research indicates that many of the symptoms of PTSD are 
actually experienced by individuals who have not experienced 
trauma.81 If this research is accurate, then the symptoms of PTSD 
have very little tendency to prove the occurrence of any trauma, 
including sexual abuse. 
The modest probative value associated with a PTSD diagnosis 
offered as proof of sexual abuse is severely outweighed by its 
83 . Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 19, at 29. 
84 . Id at 30. 
85 . . �ee Daubert 
.
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (holding 
tha� the tnal JU�ge as��ssmg the admissibility of expert testimony must apply Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 m add1t1on to Federal Rule of Evidence 702); see also State v. Catanese, 3 68 
So. 2� 975, 979-81 (La. 1979) (requiring that the probative value of scientific evidence is not 
outweighed by the potential for prejudice, waste of time, or misleading the jury). 
86 . FED. R. Evm. 403; see also Catanese, 368 So. 2d at 979-81. 
87. SeeAskowitz & Graham, supra note 2 2, at 20 48. 
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potential for confusion of the issues and unnecessary delay or waste 
of time. Although in the noted case the Louisiana Supreme Court 
refused to allow PTSD testimony on the ground that it would unduly 
prejudice the jury, expert testimony regarding mental health is 
considered '"the least over-awing'  of the different types of expert 
testimony 'because jurors have some innate knowledge of human 
behavior. "'88 Thus, juror prejudice is not as serious a threat as many 
courts imagine. Rather, the primary hazard stems from Daubert's 
notion that "[ v ]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the 
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence."89 Courts that allow experts to testify that a victim suffers 
from PTSD and that the symptoms of PTSD are consistent with 
sexual abuse invite the defense to debunk this testimony by eliciting 
from the expert the basis of his or her testimony. The expert's 
disclosure on cross-examination that the diagnosis is based, at the 
very least, on the word of the child victim will either needlessly 
confuse the jury as to the validity of the testimony, or will merely 
waste an astute jury's time.90 
The Louisiana Supreme Court correctly held that PTSD 
evidence is inadmissible when offered as substantive proof of sexual 
abuse. However, it erred by basing its holding on the grounds that 
PTSD fails to meet the Daubert standard of reliability. Instead, the 
court should have conducted a Rule 403 balancing test to determine 
the relative strength of the expert testimony's probative value in light 
of its potential for confusion and waste of time. 
Missy Thornton 
88. See id at 2096 (quoting Charles Bl eil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a 
"Better Mousetrap," 32 S. TEX. L.J. 37, 66 (1990)). 
89 . Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
90. The potential for confusion is increased when the court al lows PTSD testimony to 
be introduced as substantive proof of sexual abuse but not as evidence that the victim is 
telling the tr uth, as the Supreme Court  of New Mexico allowed in Albenco. See State v. 
Alberico, 861 P.2 d 192, 210-11 (N.M. 1993) (hol ding that PTSD evidence is inadmissible to 
prove that the victim is telling the truth). 
